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accination is a crucial tool for 
preventing and controlling 
disease, but its use has been 
plagued by controversies worldwide 
[1–6]. In this article, I look at 
the controversy surrounding the 
immunization program against polio 
in Nigeria, in which three states in 
northern Nigeria in 2003 boycotted the 
polio immunization campaign. I discuss 
the problems caused by the boycott, its 
implications, and how it was resolved. 
Finally, I make recommendations for 
the future to prevent a similar situation 
from arising.
Methods
For this article, I consulted relevant 
books, journals (online and print), 
Internet materials, and newspaper 
articles. In particular, I also searched 
for documentary materials on the 
history of vaccination in northern 
Nigeria, factors responsible for the 
boycott, and ethical issues arising from 
the boycott.
The Kick Polio Out of Africa 
Campaign
Due to the difﬁ  culty faced by some 
national governments in containing 
polio outbreaks, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in 1988 launched 
the Global Polio Eradication Initiative 
(GPEI) with the goal of eradicating 
the disease by the year 2000 (see [7] 
and http://www.polioeradication.org). 
In 1989, the World Health Assembly 
approved a global plan of action 
for eradicating polio and the WHO 
Regional Committee for Africa adopted 
the resolution [8].
The WHO Regional Committee for 
Africa intensiﬁ  ed its polio eradication 
strategies in 1996. Nelson Mandela 
launched the “Kick Polio Out of 
Africa” campaign (Figure 1) [9], which 
aimed to vaccinate 50 million children 
in 1996 alone. Mass immunization 
campaigns were boosted by National 
Immunization Days (Figure 2), acute 
ﬂ  accid paralysis surveillance, training 
of community health workers at the 
local level, and door-to-door campaigns 
[10,11].
The Kick Polio Out of Africa 
campaign assured functional cold 
chain systems and continuing 
education of communities about the 
importance of routine immunization 
[9]. From 1997, through an 
alliance with the African Football 
Confederation, leading African 
football players have participated 
in public awareness campaigns by 
distributing posters, conducting 
radio interviews, and holding public 
autograph sessions [8].
In mid-October 2003, the GPEI 
launched what was hoped to be the 
ﬁ  nal onslaught against polio, with a 
plan to immunize more than 15 million 
children in west and central Africa. The 
GPEI had particular concerns about 
the high prevalence of polio in Nigeria, 
which accounted for 45% of polio cases 
worldwide and 80% of cases reported 
from the African region in 2003 [12]. 
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Figure 1. The Kick Polio Out of Africa Campaign
This photo shows Red Cross volunteers, wearing “Kick Polio Out of Africa” T-shirts, waiting for boat 
transportation from Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on a National Immunization 
Day. (Photo: Global Polio Eradication Initiative)PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0418
This high prevalence was attributed 
to poor vaccine coverage during the 
previous control campaigns. But the 
GPEI’s hopes were dashed by a boycott 
of the polio immunization campaign in 
three states in northern Nigeria, amidst 
rumours and public distrust.
The Boycott in Northern Nigeria
Public trust is essential in promoting 
public health [13]. Such trust plays 
an important role in the public’s 
compliance with public health 
interventions, especially compliance 
with vaccination programs, which target 
mainly healthy people. Where public 
trust is eroded, rumours can spread 
and this can lead to rejection of health 
interventions.
In northern Nigeria in 2003, the 
political and religious leaders of Kano, 
Zamfara, and Kaduna states brought 
the immunization campaign to a halt 
by calling on parents not to allow their 
children to be immunized. These 
leaders argued that the vaccine could 
be contaminated with anti-fertility 
agents (estradiol hormone), HIV, and 
cancerous agents.
In an article reported by News24.
com, a South African online news 
Web site, Sule Ya’u Sule, speaking 
for the governor of Kano, is quoted 
as saying: “Since September 11, the 
Muslim world is beginning to be 
suspicious of any move from the 
Western world…Our people have 
become really concerned about polio 
vaccine” [14]. In the same article, Datti 
Ahmed, a Kano-based physician who 
heads a prominent Muslim group, the 
Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria 
(SCSN), is quoted as saying that polio 
vaccines were “corrupted and tainted 
by evildoers from America and their 
Western allies.” Ahmed went on to say: 
“We believe that modern-day Hitlers 
have deliberately adulterated the oral 
polio vaccines with anti-fertility drugs 
and…viruses which are known to cause 
HIV and AIDS” [14].
The New York Sun reported that 
this fear of polio vaccines in northern 
Nigeria “caught on because of the 
war in Iraq” [15]. Ali Guda Takai, a 
WHO doctor investigating polio cases 
in Kano, told the Baltimore Sun, “What 
is happening in the Middle East has 
aggravated the situation. If America 
is ﬁ  ghting people in the Middle East, 
the conclusion is that they are ﬁ  ghting 
Muslims” [16].
Embarrassed by the political 
undertone of the boycott, the 
prominent Islamic scholar Sheikh 
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, President of the 
International Fiqh Council, said: “In 
fact, I was completely astonished about 
the attitude of our fellow scholars 
of Kano towards polio vaccine. I 
disapprove of their opinion, for the 
lawfulness of such vaccine in the 
point of view of Islam is as clear as 
sunlight” [17]. Sheikh Qaradawi said 
that the same polio vaccine has been 
effective in over 50 Muslim countries, 
and blamed the SCSN for creating a 
negative image of Islam: “They distort 
the image of Islam and make it appear 
as if it contradicts science and medical 
progress” [17].
Background to the Boycott
The historical context. The polio 
vaccination boycott should not be 
considered in isolation, but rather 
in the context of the history of 
orthodox health services in northern 
Nigeria. Generally, utilization rates 
of orthodox health-care services in 
the region have always been low. For 
instance, comparative utilization rates 
of southern Nigeria versus northern 
Nigeria were 50% versus 18% in 1990 
(i.e., half of people in the south used 
orthodox health services, compared 
with less than one ﬁ  fth in the north), 
60% versus 11% in 1999, and 64% 
versus 8% in 2003 [18–20].
Other historical factors that fed 
into the polio vaccination boycott 
include population and fertility 
regulation. In the 1980s, President 
Babangida’s administration adopted 
a population policy that set a limit 
of four children per woman. Some 
people connected this population 
control campaign with immunization, 
believing that vaccination was one way 
the government might be reducing the 
population [21]. This belief was not 
restricted to northern Nigeria—similar 
opinions were also expressed in some 
communities in southern Nigeria.
For example, in an anthropological 
study carried out in Nigeria [22], 
an adult male participant stated 
that “people do carry rumour that 
immunisation is a secret way of 
controlling population.” A young 
female participant said “some people 
say that immunisation is part of the 
methods used to check the number of 
children a woman can bear.”
Another important factor that 
played a role in the polio vaccine 
boycott was the general distrust 
of aggressive, mass immunization 
programs in a country where access 
to basic health care is not easily 
available [16]. In his report for 
the Baltimore Sun, John Murphy 
wrote: “The aggressive door-to-
door mass immunizations that have 
slashed polio infections around the 
world also raise suspicions. From a 
Nigerian’s perspective, to be offered 
free medicine is about as unusual 
as a stranger’s going door to door 
in America and handing over $100 
bills. It does not make any sense in 
a country where people struggle to 
obtain the most basic medicines and 
treatment at local clinics” [16].
The political context. In Nigeria, 
states have administrative control 
over health affairs at the primary 
and secondary care levels while the 
federal government has control at the 
tertiary care level. Although the federal 
government sets health policy for the 
nation, immunization is under the 
primary health-care system controlled 
by each state government. This was 
why the Kano state government was 
able to issue a directive to halt the 
immunization exercise planned by the 
federal government.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040073.g002
Figure 2. A Vaccination Team Crosses a 
River to Reach a Village During a National 
Immunization Day
(Photo: Global Polio Eradication Initiative)
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Nigeria being a multiparty 
society, opposition parties exercise 
their political rights by constantly 
challenging the ruling party. After the 
May 2003 presidential elections the All 
Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) led by 
General Muhammadu Buhari, one-time 
military dictator and Head of State, 
ﬁ  led a case in Nigeria’s Supreme Court 
challenging the victory of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo of the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) [23]. Also, 
Kano as a state under the control of the 
ANPP challenged the polio vaccination 
exercise organized by the PDP-
controlled federal government.
Nigeria is undergoing a political 
transition from a northern-led military 
regime to a southern-led democracy. 
Until 1999, the north had ruled the 
country for more than 30 of the 46 
years of independence. Since the 
beginning of the new democratic 
system of government in 1999, power 
shifted to the south (speciﬁ  cally the 
south-west). These changes have 
resulted in political tensions between 
the south and north. These tensions 
might explain why the religious leaders 
in northern states who boycotted 
the polio immunization campaign 
believed that the southern-led federal 
government was acting in the interests 
of Western powers. The northern and 
southern parts of the country had 
different colonial experiences. While 
the north was colonized by the Islamic 
Jihadists, the south was colonized by 
the British. These colonial experiences 
are responsible for political differences 
between north and south and different 
attitudes to modern medicine.
The Trovan trial. Suspicions about 
Western health interventions were 
already circulating in northern Nigeria, 
ahead of the polio vaccination boycott, 
in the wake of Pﬁ  zer’s 1996 “Trovan 
trial” [24–26]. The trial was discussed 
in detail in a BMJ feature entitled 
“Pﬁ  zer accused of testing new drug 
without ethical approval” [24].
In brief, the BMJ reports that in 1996 
Pﬁ  zer sent a team to Kano during an 
epidemic of meningococcal meningitis. 
To test the efﬁ  cacy of its new antibiotic 
trovaﬂ  oxacin (Trovan), the team 
conducted an open-label trial in 200 
children—half were given the gold 
standard treatment for meningitis, 
ceftriaxone, and half received 
trovaﬂ  oxacin. Five of the children 
given trovaﬂ  oxacin died, together 
with six who were given ceftriaxone. 
The BMJ reported: “The Washington 
Post has been investigating the trial 
and alleges that at least one child was 
not taken off the experimental drug 
and given the standard drug when it 
was clear that her condition was not 
improving—which is against ethical 
guidelines.” The BMJ reported that the 
Nigerian health minister appointed a 
federal investigative panel to determine 
whether the trial was conducted legally, 
and if so, whether it was morally right.
On May 7, 2006, The Washington Post 
reported that it had been privileged 
to see a secret report of the panel’s 
investigation, which alleged that 
Pﬁ  zer undertook an “illegal trial 
of an unregistered drug” when the 
company enrolled children into the 
Trovan trial [27]. In response to the 
leaked report, Pﬁ  zer issued a press 
statement saying: “Pﬁ  zer is conﬁ  dent 
that no one associated with the Trovan 
clinical study—conducted in Kano, 
Nigeria during a meningitis epidemic 
in 1996—ever put a patient’s health at 
risk and that the company acted in the 
best interests of the children involved 
in the study, using the best medical 
knowledge available” [28].
In 2001, 30 Nigerian families sued 
Pﬁ  zer in a federal court in New York 
[29]. The suit alleged: “Pﬁ  zer chose 
to select children to participate in a 
medical experiment of a new, untested 
and unproven drug without ﬁ  rst 
obtaining their informed consent.” 
During the following four years, Pﬁ  zer 
argued that the case should not be 
heard in a United States court at all 
[30]. In August 2005, Southern District 
of New York Judge William H. Pauley III 
agreed, ruling that Nigeria, not the US, 
was the proper place to try a lawsuit over 
Pﬁ  zer’s conduct in the Trovan trial [31].
According to John Murphy’s report 
for the Baltimore Sun, the Trovan 
trial may have left some Nigerians 
distrustful of Western interventions: 
“Some of Kano’s fears of the vaccine 
stem from its experience with the U.S. 
pharmaceutical giant Pﬁ  zer Inc.” [16].
Federal Response 
to the Polio Boycott
In response to public outcry about 
the polio vaccine, the Nigerian 
federal government set up a technical 
committee on October 29, 2003 to 
assess the safety of the polio vaccine, 
sending samples of the vaccine 
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Figure 3. The Five States in Northern Nigeria That Accounted for 51% of All Polio Cases 
Worldwide in 2006 
(Illustration: Anthony Flores; data derived from http://www.polioeradication.org/content/
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for laboratory tests abroad. The 
committee’s report, however, was 
rejected by the SCSN, which alleged 
that the Muslim community was 
not properly represented on the 
committee.
In response to this allegation, the 
federal government appointed another 
technical committee, which included 
selected members of the Muslim 
group Jama’atu Nasril Islam, to further 
reconﬁ  rm the safety of the vaccine. But 
the SCSN again rejected the nominees, 
asking for the inclusion of its own 
nominees. Justifying its continued 
opposition to the polio vaccine despite 
the alarming 30% increase in polio 
prevalence, in January 2004, the Kano 
State Government argued: “…a lesser 
of two evils, to sacriﬁ  ce two, three, 
four, ﬁ  ve even ten children to polio 
than allow hundreds of thousands or 
possibly millions of girl-children likely 
to be rendered infertile” [17].
Although the truth of the rumour 
that the polio vaccine contained HIV 
and cancerous and anti-fertility agents 
was never established, the lack of trust 
among the general population in 
northern Nigeria about the efﬁ  cacy 
of Western medicine remained. All 
efforts by the federal government to 
dispel the rumours were rejected. For 
instance, in April 2004 Datti Ahmed 
argued that “the SCSN harbours 
strong reservations on the safety of 
our population, not least because of 
our recent experience in the Pﬁ  zer 
scandal, when our people were used 
as guinea pigs with the approval of the 
Federal Ministry of Health, and the 
relevant UN agencies” [17].
This impasse was eventually resolved 
in July 2004 through dialogue, with 
religious leaders playing a signiﬁ  cant 
role in the process. The federal 
government had invited political 
and religious leaders to a series of 
meetings in order to ﬁ  nd a solution to 
the impasse. The WHO and UNICEF 
also played a role in breaking the 
deadlock. These meetings led to a 
consensus in February 2004 to accept 
the SCSN’s demand to test the vaccine 
independently in a Muslim country. 
In February 2004, the Nigerian 
government sent state and religious 
representatives to South Africa, 
Indonesia, and India to observe testing 
of the polio vaccine and “bring back 
proof” that it was not contaminated 
with HIV [17].
In defence of the 11-month 
boycott, the Kano state governor, 
Ibrahim Shekarau, reafﬁ  rmed that 
their decision was inﬂ  uenced by 
unsatisfactory test results by the federal 
government’s teams. Satisﬁ  ed by the 
quality and process of production of 
the polio vaccine, the Kano state team 
returned with a seal of approval from 
Biopharma, an Indonesian company, 
which they later recommended be 
the new supplier of polio vaccines for 
the predominantly Muslim states and 
perhaps the rest of the country [17]. 
Indonesia is a Muslim country trusted 
by Nigeria’s Muslim leaders for testing 
the polio vaccine.
Two months after Kano state 
resumed its polio immunization 
program, about 150 Muslim clerics 
and traditional chiefs from Chad, 
Cameroon, Niger, Togo, Benin, 
and Burkina Faso met in Kano on 
September 22, 2004 to discuss the 
way forward in respect to the polio 
immunization campaign. The meeting 
was hosted by WHO and UNICEF, 
and its aim was to “inform religious 
and traditional leaders about issues 
that affect children, with emphasis 
on polio.” The meeting also shared 
knowledge and experiences and 
generated an advocacy agenda to 
ensure that the right messages were 
delivered to the people [32,33].
African Communitarianism
The federal government, having lost 
the public trust of one state—a loss 
of trust fuelled by Muslim leaders—
became handicapped in providing 
health services. In many parts of Africa, 
communication and authority ﬂ  ow 
downward from community leaders 
who are the gate keepers and decision 
makers. In the Hausa community of 
northern Nigeria, traditional rulers 
have powers derived from both culture 
and religion. This gives them the 
opportunity to perform both political 
and religious roles. They rule through 
the traditional and the Islamic councils, 
under the supervision of the local 
government, having their received staff 
of ofﬁ  ce from the state government.
The modern political system 
in northern Nigeria relies on 
this structure to reach out and 
mobilize people. This is important 
in the sense that it shows a type of 
communitarianism where individual 
autonomy cannot be separated from 
that of the community [34]. The Kano 
state leaders believed that they were 
acting to protect the interest of their 
people, though unfortunately, they 
ended up disrupting national and 
global health agendas.
The Future of Immunization Efforts
A fresh outbreak of polio was reported 
in Kano in October 2003. The BBC 
reported that, due to this fresh 
outbreak, a new strain of the polio 
virus was traced to other parts of the 
country [35]. Even many years after 
the boycott, polio outbreaks remain 
a regular occurrence in Nigeria, and 
these show some form of resistance 
to vaccines. While three or four doses 
of polio vaccine administered to a 
young infant are enough to provide 
protection in most parts of the world, 
in Nigeria, with so much polio virus 
circulating, children under ﬁ  ve years 
must be immunized up to eight or 
more times [23].
The recent case of an 18-month-old 
boy in Nasarawa in Kano shows that 
there is ongoing suspicion about the 
polio vaccine in Nigeria. The boy was 
considered likely to have polio, having 
lost the use of one of his legs after 
being diagnosed with acute ﬂ  accid 
paralysis. His mother conﬁ  rmed that 
he had never been vaccinated because 
her husband did not allow it [23]. It is 
still a major undertaking to have the 
population understand that the vaccine 
is safe [36].
The September 2006 report of the 
WHO Regional Committee for Africa 
indicated that “there continues to 
be very high-intensity wild poliovirus 
transmission in the remaining endemic 
country in the region. The number 
of conﬁ  rmed polio cases in northern 
Nigeria more than doubled in the ﬁ  rst 
ﬁ  ve months of 2006 as compared to 
the same period in 2005. Nigeria now 
accounts for over 80% of the 2006 
global polio burden” [37,38].
New cases of polio have recently 
been reported in several west and 
central African countries that were 
previously free of polio: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, and Togo. The Lancet recently 
reported that “poliovirus serotype 1 
caused a very serious and large scale 
outbreak during 2004 in western 
and central Africa (spreading from 
Nigeria) where vaccination was refused 
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for political or theological reasons, 
or fear of deliberate contamination 
of the vaccine with HIV or infertility 
agents” [38].
The report stated further that: 
“the same virus travelled in 2005 to 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia 
(probably by Muslim pilgrims returning 
from the Hajj or migrant workers)” 
[38]. As a result, over 1,500 children 
were paralyzed. These new cases are 
genetically linked to the polio virus 
endemic in northern Nigeria (Figure 
3). New cases of polio genetically linked 
to the wild polio strain from Nigeria 
have also been recorded in countries as 
far as the Sudan and Botswana, which 
were also previously free of polio [38].
How Can the Health Community 
Prevent Further Boycotts?
The vaccine boycott in Nigeria was 
inﬂ  uenced by a complex interplay of 
factors. These factors included lack of 
trust in modern medicine, political and 
religious motives, a history of perceived 
betrayal by the federal government, 
the medical establishment, and big 
business, and a conceivably genuine—
albeit misplaced and ineffective—
attempt by the local leadership to 
protect its people.
A recent editorial in The Lancet 
argued that “few data exist on the 
best way to stop the spread of false 
information” [39]. One lesson from 
the Kano boycott is that research is 
needed to investigate why people have 
concerns and fears about vaccination, 
and what steps should be taken to avoid 
boycotts in the future. Other lessons 
are discussed below.
Governments should be sensitive to 
local politics, especially as they affect 
health-care delivery. Immunization 
campaign programs should be a 
participatory event involving state 
and local governments, community 
leaders, and parents. There are 
three types of community leaders in 
northern Nigeria—traditional rulers, 
political leaders, and religious leaders. 
Traditional rulers acquire their status 
through succession and their authority 
is rooted in traditions and customs 
[40–42]. Political leaders acquire their 
status through the political process and 
religious leaders do so on a religious 
basis. Among the three, the traditional 
ruler is best placed to represent the 
interests of children. Community 
leaders may contribute to the success or 
failure of health research and delivery 
[43,44].
Public awareness campaigns about 
vaccination are crucial. These should 
stress the value of immunization and 
involve the media. Reaching the 
community requires radio, television, 
and folk media (such as local music, 
theatre, and festivals). Immunization 
messages can be packaged into 
songs by local musicians and can be 
communicated through drama in the 
language that local people understand.
Research ethics committees 
should be established in each local 
government. These committees would 
examine and approve or reject health 
research in its sphere of inﬂ  uence. 
Members of these community-based 
ethics committees should include 
volunteers who are ready to undergo 
basic ethics training relevant to their 
duties. The committees should be 
under the supervision of, and funded 
by, the local government’s councils, 
and the committees should work with 
local medical associations. They should 
choose their own chairperson and 
determine their own agenda in line with 
the national ethics code. Barriers to the 
formation of local ethics committees 
include inadequate capacity, funding, 
and communication.  
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